Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
When Plato has provided thus much, he treats his city as already
planted and brought to consummation. He thinks himself farther
entitled to proclaim it as perfectly good, and therefore as
including the four constituent elements of Good: that is, as being
wise, brave, temperate, just.[3] He then looks to find wherein
each of these four elements resides: wisdom resides specially in
the cabinet of Rulers--courage specially in the
Guardians--temperance and justice, in these two, but in the
producing multitude also. The two last virtues are universal in
the Commonwealth. Temperance consists in the harmony of opinion
between the multitude and the two higher classes as to obedience:
the Guardians are as ready to obey as the Chiefs to command: the
multitude are also for the most part ready to obey--but should
they ever fail in obedience, the Guardians are prepared to lend
their constraining force to the authority of the Chiefs. Having
thus settled three out of the four elements of Good, which
enumeration he assumes to be exhaustive--Plato assumes that what
remains must be Justice. This remainder he declares to be--That
each of the three portions of the Commonwealth performs its own
work and nothing else: and this is Justice. Justice and Temperance
are thus common to all the three portions of the Commonwealth:
while Wisdom and Prudence belong entirely to the Chiefs, and
Courage entirely to the Guardians.
[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D-428 A. [Greek:
ô|kisme/nê me\n toi/nun, ê)=n d' e)gô/, ê/dê a)/n soi
ei)/ê, ô)= pai= A)ri/stônos, ê( po/lis . . . Oi)=mai ê(mi=n
tê\n po/lin, ei)/per o)rthô=s ge ô/|kistai, _te/leôs
a)gathê\n ei)=nai_. A)na/gkê, e)/phê. Dê=lon dê/, o(/ti
sophê/ t' e)sti\ kai\ a)ndrei/a kai\ sô/phrôn kai\ dikai/a.
Dê=lon. Ou)kou=n, o(/, ti a)\n au)tô=n eu(/rômen e)n au)tê=|,
to\ u(po/loipon e)/stai to\ ou)ch eu(rême/non?] &c.]
[Side-note: First mention of these, as an exhaustive
classification, in ethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction
between Temperance and Justice.]