Platonism in English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — Plato — John Shaqi
Platonism in English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
Plato · en
The spiritual welfare of the soul was the prime object of importance to
the Christian. Through the power of its doctrine of heavenly beauty
Platonism had entered into the conception of this life considered in its
heavenward aspect. It remained to show how it could explain the right
manner of conduct for the soul in the presence of those strong passions
which were felt as the disturbing elements of its inner welfare. In the
Platonic system of morality there was a conception of temperance,
σωφροσύνη, based upon an analysis of the soul sufficiently comprehensive
to cover the entire scope of its activities; in fact, temperance was
there conceived as the necessary condition for the presence of any
virtue in the soul. The vitality of this teaching in English poetry is
found in the second book of Spenser’s “Faerie Queene,” celebrating the
exploits of the knight Guyon,
“In whom great rule of Temp’raunce goodly doth appeare.”
(Introd., stz. 5.)
The adventures of Guyon, through the discipline of which he perfects
himself in temperance, fall into two distinct groups. Up to the sixth
book the conflicts in which he is concerned are those calculated to try
his mastery of the angry impulses of his nature. After the sixth book
his struggles record his proficiency in governing the sensual desires of
appetite. This division is made in accordance with the analysis of the
soul on which Plato bases his doctrine of temperance. Within the soul
are three distinct principles,—one rational and two irrational. The
irrational principles are, first, the irascible impulse of spirit
(θυμός) with which a man is angry and, second, the appetitive instinct
the workings of which are manifested in all the sensual gratifications
of the body, and in the love of wealth. The rational principle is that
of reason by which a man learns truth. (“Republic,” IX. 580, 581.)
Against this one rational principle the two irrational impulses are
constantly insurgent, and temperance is that harmony or order resulting
in the soul when the rational principle rules and the two irrational
principles are obedient to its sovereignty. “And would you not say,”
asks Socrates, “that he is temperate who has these same elements in
friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the
two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason
ought to rule, and do not rebel?” (“Republic,” IV. 442.)