The argument of the “Anti-psychopannychia” and of the “Anti-monopsychia” centres about the doctrine of the mystic union with God. The argument in the “Psychathanasia” is a critique of materialism rather than a positive plea for the existence of the soul after death. It was the purpose of More in his two pendants to his longer poem to treat of the state of the soul after death. That it is not enveloped in eternal night he proves in his “Anti-psychopannychia.” His argument is briefly this: Since God is a unity everywhere present, he is infinite freedom. (II. 2.) Since the soul’s activities of will and intellect are free from dependence upon the body, death will be but the ushering of the soul into the life of God’s large liberty. “Wherefore the soul cut off from lowly sense By harmlesse fate, far greater libertie Must gain: for when it hath departed hence (As all things else) should it not backward hie From whence it came? but such divinitie Is in our souls that nothing lesse than God Could send them forth (as Plato’s schools descrie) Wherefore when they retreat a free abode They’ll find, unlesse kept off by _Nemesis_ just rod.” (II. 14.) In this life of union the soul will realize the deep fecundity of her own nature; for in her are innate ideas. To establish this theory of innate ideas into which Plato’s theory of reminiscence has been transformed in Plotinus (cf. “Enneads,” IV. iii. 25), More educes four considerations. They must exist because (1) like is known only by like (II. 31); (2) no object or number of objects can give the soul a universal concept (II. 36); (3) the apprehension of incorporeal things cannot be made by sense, therefore the soul must have the measure of such within her own nature (II. 38, 39); and (4) the process of learning shows that it is education, or the drawing out of the mind what was in it potentially (II. 42). Inasmuch, then, as innate ideas exist within the mind, called out by experience in life, how much more will they be evoked in that high union with God! “But sith our soul with God himself may meet, Inacted by his life, I cannot see What scruple then remains that moven might Least doubt but that she wakes with open eye, When fate her from this body doth untie. Wherefore her choisest forms do then arise, Rowz’d up by union and large sympathy With Gods own spright: she plainly then descries Such plentitude of life, as she could nere devise.” (III. 2.) But this union of the soul with The One may be thought to obliterate self-identity after death and teach only a universal absorption of all souls into The One. To combat this idea More contends in his “Anti-monopsychia” that by virtue of the “Deiformity” of the soul, by which he means its ability to be joined with God, the soul in death is so