_Men._ I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. [Sidenote: Health and strength, and virtue and temperance and justice are the same both in men and women.] _Soc._ And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? _Men._ I think not. [Sidenote: _The sameness of virtue._] _Soc._ And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether 73 in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? _Men._ I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others. _Soc._ But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? _Men._ I did say so. _Soc._ And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? _Men._ Certainly not. _Soc._ Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? _Men._ Certainly. _Soc._ Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? _Men._ True. _Soc._ And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? _Men._ They cannot. _Soc._ They must be temperate and just? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues? _Men._ Such is the inference. _Soc._ And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same? _Men._ They would not. [Sidenote: Then what is virtue? Gorgias and Meno reply, ‘The power of governing mankind.’] _Soc._ Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. _Men._ Will you have one definition of them all? _Soc._ That is what I am seeking. _Men._ If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. [Sidenote: _The nature of definition._] _Soc._ And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? [Sidenote: But this cannot apply to all persons.] _Men._ I think not, Socrates. _Soc._ No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is ‘the power of governing;’ but do you not add ‘justly and not unjustly’? _Men._ Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.