The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions — Plato — John Shaqi
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
_Men._ O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that
you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; 80
and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply
getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits’ end.
And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem
to me both in your appearance and in your power over others
to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who
come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me,
I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I
do not know how to answer you; and though I have been
delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before
now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as
I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is.
And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going
away from home, for if you did in other places as you do
in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
_Soc._ You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
_Men._ What do you mean, Socrates?
_Soc._ I can tell why you made a simile about me.
_Men._ Why?
[Sidenote: Socrates is the cause of dulness in others because he is
himself dull.]
_Soc._ In order that I might make another simile about you.
For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty
similes made about them—as well they may—but I shall not
return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo
is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then
indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex
others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed
myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you
seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps
know before you touched me. However, I have no objection
to join with you in the enquiry.
_Men._ And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which
you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of
enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever
know that this is the thing which you did not know?
[Sidenote: _Pindar and the poets._]
[Sidenote: How can you enquire about what you do not know, and if you
know why should you enquire?]
_Soc._ I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what
a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that
a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or
about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has
no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not
know the very subject about which he is to enquire[5].
_Men._ Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? 81
_Soc._ I think not.
_Men._ Why not?
_Soc._ I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise
men and women who spoke of things divine that—
_Men._ What did they say?