The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions — Plato — John Shaqi
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
_Soc._ And virtue makes us good?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all
good things are profitable?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then virtue is profitable?
_Men._ That is the only inference.
_Soc._ Then now let us see what are the things which
severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and
wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ And yet these things may also sometimes do us 88
harm: would you not think so?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And what is the guiding principle which makes them
profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they
are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
_Men._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they
are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension,
memory, magnanimity, and the like?
_Men._ Surely.
_Soc._ And such of these as are not knowledge, but of
another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful;
as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only
a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is
harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
[Sidenote: _Virtue is knowledge._]
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ And the same may be said of temperance and quickness
of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done
with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they
are hurtful?
_Men._ Very true.
_Soc._ And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures,
when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness;
but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the
opposite?
_Men._ That appears to be true.
[Sidenote: And so all virtue must be a sort of wisdom or knowledge.]
_Soc._ If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted
to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none
of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in
themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by
the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is
profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
_Men._ I quite agree.
_Soc._ And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of
which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good
and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or
hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly
or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited
when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish
soul wrongly?
_Men._ Yes.