_Soc._ Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained ‘what it is.’ But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,—such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question ‘Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,’ to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked [7]whether 87 a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle[7], will reply: ‘I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that [8]when you have produced a given side of it[8], the given area of the triangle falls short by an area [9]corresponding to the part produced[9], then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle:’—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, ‘remembered’? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught? _Men._ I agree. _Soc._ Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: _Virtue and knowledge._] _Soc._ Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: ‘Of course.’] _Soc._ The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? _Men._ Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. [Sidenote: But is virtue knowledge?] _Soc._ Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: Virtue is a good, and profitable: and all profitable things are either profitable or the reverse according as they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge.] _Soc._ Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? _Men._ True.