The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
that primarily, which its effect is secondarily. And hence we infer,
that if the sensible universe be replete with forms of every kind, the
exemplars of those forms, must subsist in immaterial perfection, in the
artificer of the world.
If this sensible world, then, be formed according to the exemplar of
that which is intelligible; may we not say, with the great Plotinus,
that it is requisite universal animal should there primarily subsist in
perfect vital energy, containing all things in its omniform essence.
“Hence (says he[6]) the heavens are there a divine animal, replete with
ideal stars. Earth too does not there subsist solitary, but is much
more vital than this corporeal earth, for it is full of intellectual
life. The sea too is there, and all water subsisting in life, and an
ever-abiding stream. For how is it possible that any thing not vital,
can be the progeny of life itself? He, therefore, who enquires from
whence animals originate in the intelligible world, might as well
enquire from whence all life, and soul, and universal intellect, arose.
For here there is nothing indigent nor defective, but every thing is
perfect and exuberant. Here they all flow from one fountain, not as
from a certain spirit, or heat, but as if from an universal quality,
possessing and preserving in itself, all qualities; such as sweetness,
accompanied with fragrance of smell, the vigour of wine, and the
strength of all juices, bright colours, and whatever is perceived by
the taste.”
3. Such then are the arguments which the Platonic philosophy affords
in defence of ideas; the existence of which was so evident to Plato,
that, in the Sophista, he compares those who oppose the friends of
ideas to the giants of old, warring, as it were, on celestial souls,
and such as are engaged in sublime investigations. Let us now consider
to what universals these lucid beings are confined; since, according to
the Pythagoreans and Platonists, there are not ideas of all universal
conceptions. “For, in the first place (says Syrianus[7]), there are no
ideas of things evil and base, because these subsist in nature rather
by a privation and absence of ideas. And, on this account, they are
said to exist contrary to nature. Nor, secondly, of negations, for
these are destructive of the bound and limitation which is attributed
to every thing from the unifying and comprehending nature of ideas;
and hence, separation is rather the result of material infinity than
of that which is formal or ideal. Nor again, are there any ideas of
things which at different times receive a variety of conditions. For
these participate of transmutation from a moveable cause, but not from
the immoveable and stable illustration of ideas. Nor again of parts,
such as the hand, head, fingers, and the like. For the causes of
things existing entire, produce whole species and forms; not divided
about the parts of these, like the reasons of nature. But neither did