The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
How can it be consonant to reason to suppose that the conception of
_one_ arises from the sensation of some one particular subject?
For one particular man, who is discerned by sense, is by no means the
same with one itself, since, if this were the case, thought could never
predicate one of that which is not a man. Besides, as cogitation, on
beholding the different positions of things, affirms that this is here
or there, so when it perceives an individual, pronounces one; for that
passion is not vain, nor does it assert one of a non-entity. Nor must
we think it predicates ones, because this individual is different from
another; for when cogitation affirms such a thing is this, and not
another, it declares, in the mean time, that the other is _one_.
Likewise when it affirms that any thing is this _alone_, it then
declares, that what is alone is one: on which account, it predicates
one, prior to alone. Besides, if there be multitude, it is necessary
that one should antecede; since when it predicates _many_, it
pronounces more than one. And when it affirms that an army contains a
multitude of men, it conceives the soldiers reduced to one order.
For thought, indeed, does not permit multitude to remain perfect
multitude, destitute of the conciliating power of unity; in which
very circumstance, the subsistence of one is evinced; for acutely
and swiftly perceiving the one which results from order, it reduces
the nature of the many into one. Besides, we affirm that a house and
an army are each one, but that a house is more one than an army, on
account of the continuity of its parts. If therefore, one is contained
more in that which is continued than in that which is discrete, and
still more in what is perfectly indivisible, it is evident that _the
one_ is a certain nature, and has a real being. For it is impossible
that the more and the less should take place among things which have no
subsistence. If then it be not possible to understand any thing without
one or two, or some other number, it is by no means proper to deny
existence to that, without which we cannot comprehend the existence
or properties of any being: but it is requisite _that_ nature
should antecede all discourse, and intelligence, which is every where
necessary to their existence.