4. But let us now consider the nature of numbers; for as every form is a number, according to the Pythagoreans[8], a speculation of this kind must afford no small light to the arduous investigation of ideas. Will it not, therefore, be proper, in the first place, to enquire, with the great Plotinus[9], whether multitude is not a departure and distance from _one_, so that infinity itself is a separation from unity in the extreme, because it is no other than innumerable multitude; that on this account it becomes evil; and that we contract a similar nature when departing from intellectual unity, we are divided by sensible multitude? For a being then properly becomes many, when no longer able to remain collected in itself, the same, it is diffused abroad, and thus, being dispersed, is variously extended; so that when, by diffusion, it is absolutely deprived of unity, it becomes perfect multitude, destitute of that universal cement, which unites one part with another. But whenever the conciliating one is present, then that which was scattered and diffused, becoming permanent by its bounding power, passes into magnitude. But if any one should deny the subsistence of unity, asserting that one is no where to be found, which is not some particular one; and should hence affirm, that what is called one abstractedly, is only a certain affection of the soul towards any being; we ask, what prohibits the appellation of essence, from being nothing more than an affection of the soul, and consequently the existence of _being_, a delusion? For we predicate unity of particulars with as great propriety as being. I am well aware, that philosophers of the present day will answer, that we have an evident proof of the reality of being, from its agitating the soul, and becoming apparent in the phantasy: to which we reply, that in like manner, the soul is agitated, and the imagination influenced about the _one_. For every individual as much excites the perception of one, as of being. Besides, it is necessary to enquire whether we behold this passion and conception of the soul, as one or multitude. And again, when we say not one, we do not then possess one from the thing itself; for we say that one is not contained in that individual. And hence we must possess one in our own nature, and this must reside in the soul, separate from that which is denominated some particular one. But here it may be objected, that the one we possess is received from externals, and is nothing more than a conception of the mind, produced by the thing itself. For it will be said, that as multitude is nothing besides a number of individuals, which are called many, so one is nothing besides one thing; and is formed by thought separating that one particular from others. To this we reply as follows: