The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
[25]Again, axioms differ from postulates in this:--they demand our
assent without any previous solicitation, from the illustrious
certainty they possess. Their truth may, indeed, be denied by external
speech, but never from internal connection. He who denies that
equal things shall remain from the subtraction of equal, dissents,
as Euripides says, with his tongue, and not with his heart. But
demonstration depends not on external speech, but on intellectual and
internal conviction; and hence, axioms derive all their authority
from intrinsic approbation, and not from public proclaim. For the
prompt decisions of the tongue are frequently dissonant from the
sentiments concealed in the secret recesses of the heart. Thus the
[26]geometrician does not speculate those lines which are the objects
of corporeal sight, but such as are exhibited by mental conception,
and of which the delineations on paper, or in the dust, are no more
than imperfect copies, notes, and resemblances. Thus, when he draws
a pedal line which is not pedal, or an equilateral triangle which is
not equilateral, we must pay no regard to the designations of the pen,
but solely attend to the intellection of the mind; for the property
demonstrated of some particular line, is in the conclusion applied
to one that is universal, and this true line could be no otherwise
signified to the learner than by a material description.
The certainty of axioms is, indeed, in a measure obvious to every one.
For what more evident than that nothing exists of which it is possible,
at the same time, to affirm and deny any circumstance of being? Indeed,
so illustrious and indubitable is the light of this axiom, that in any
demonstration we are ashamed to assign it the place of an assumption.
It would almost seem prolix and superfluous, since there is nothing
more manifest and certain; and yet there are cases in which it is
necessary to rank it among assumptions. And these take place whenever
the intention is to conclude the existence of something as true, and
of its opposite as false. Thus, for instance, in the demonstration
that the world is finite, we assume this principle, and then reason as
follows:
Bound and infinite cannot be at the same time affirmed and denied
of any _body_:
The world is a body:
Therefore the world is not at the same time finite and infinite.