The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
But if _the one_ which is _the one itself_ alone has a subsistence, and
there is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one
but many things; since one and another thing are more than one, and are
not one thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among
all things either whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which
has parts is many, and every whole has parts. But _the one_ is in no
respect many. Neither therefore will there be a whole, nor that which
has parts. Farther still, neither is it possible that there should
be a beginning, or end of any thing. For that which has a beginning,
a middle, and an end, is divisible. But _the one_ is not divisible,
because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a beginning,
nor a middle, nor an end. Again, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence,
no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either
rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is
rectilinear, it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes.
If it is circular, there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other
things as extremes, to which the middle extends. And if it is mixed
from the right and circular line, it will consist of many things, and
will not be one.
Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing.
For that which is in another thing is different from that in which it
is. But _the one_ alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no
means be in another thing) there will be no being which is in another
thing. But that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend
and be comprehended; and in this, to comprehend will not be the same
thing as to be comprehended; nor will there be the same[136] definition
of both. There will therefore be two things, and no longer _the one_
alone. Again, neither will any being be moved. For being moved indeed,
it must necessarily be changed. But being changed it must be in
another thing. If _the one_ however alone has an existence, it is not
possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. Hence it is
not possible for any being to be changed. But every thing which stands
still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same
is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For
that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something
else. But it has been demonstrated, that it is neither in itself,
nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither
therefore does any being stand still.