Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides _the one itself_, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another thing. For there will not be any other being. And _the one itself_ will not be different from itself; for it would be many and not one. Nor will it be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another, and same is not _the one itself_. For _the one_ is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is the same with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion; but every thing dissimilar a certain different passion. _The one_, however, cannot suffer any thing, nor can this be the case with any thing else besides _the one_; since nothing else has any existence whatever, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence. Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else besides _the one_. For how can things which have no existence be separate, or come into contact with any thing? But neither can _the one_ either be separate from itself, or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate. But _the one_ suffers no other thing besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence. But neither can _the one_ be equal or unequal to itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but another as less; so that it will be two things and not one. And if _the one_ is equal to itself, _the one_ will measure itself. This however is impossible. For _the one_ will measure and be measured by itself, so that it will not be _the one itself_. Neither therefore will there be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any thing, or have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these things. Neither however, is it possible for the many alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that every being should be both many and one.