The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
If this however is the case, either _the many_ must participate of
_the one_, or _the one_ of _the many_, or both must participate of
each other, or neither of each other; but _the many_ indeed must be
separate, and _the one_ must also be separate, in order that _the many_
and _the one_ may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither
_the one_ participates of _the many_, nor _the many_ of _the one_, the
same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in the hypothesis
of _the many_ alone having a subsistence. For again there will be _the
many_ separate from _the one_. For if _the one_ subsists by itself, and
_the many_ do not in any respect participate of _the one_, _the many_
will be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same
and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number
nor any knowledge of _the many_. For the absence of _the one_ compels
all these consequences to be apparent in _the many_. It is impossible
therefore, that neither _the many_ should participate of _the one_, nor
_the one_ of _the many_.
If however, _the one_ participates of _the many_, and _the many_ of
_the one_, and both these are in each other, it is necessary that
there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor
many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that
there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins _multitude_
to _the one_, and _the one_ to _multitude_. For it is necessary that
every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in
short, if _the one_ and _multitude_ participate of each other, neither
_the one_ is the cause of essence to _multitude_, nor _multitude_
to _the one_, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to
both, and which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes
this to be multitude, and that to be one? And what is the cause of
this communication and association with each other, _the one_ so far
as it is one never having any communication with _the many_? For
_the many_ so far as many, and _the one_ so far as one are different
from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no
sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these
into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For
being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other,
or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should
happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from
each other, since now also they subsist together causally. It is
however impossible for _the many_ to subsist separate from _the one_.
The mixture therefore is not causal. But neither is the mixture from
_the many_, if neither _the one_ is the cause of _the many_, nor _the
many_ of _the one_. What therefore is this more excellent thing [which
is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But