principle of beings is moved, but every thing which is moved is moved through the want of good, and towards another thing which is the object of desire to it, there will be something else which is desirable to the principle of beings besides itself, and about which possessing a sameness of subsistence, we must say it is moved. This however is impossible. For the principle is that for the sake of which all things subsist, which all things desire, and which is indigent of nothing. For if it were in want of something, it would be entirely subordinate to that of which it is in want, and to which its energy is directed as the object of desire. But if the principle is immoveable (for this is what remains,) it is necessary that it should be one incorporeal essence, possessing an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what manner, however, does it possess _the one_? And how is it one essence? For if essence and _the one_ are the same, it must be admitted that the principle of beings is essence. But if essence is different from _the one_, it must be granted that to be _the one_ is not the same thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is better than _the one_, according to this it must be said to be with the principle. But if _the one_ is better than essence and beyond it, _the one_ is also the principle of essence. And if they are coordinate to each other, the many will be prior to _the one_.[141] This, however, is impossible as we have before demonstrated. It is evident, indeed, that essence is not the same as _the one_. For it is not one and the same thing to say one, and that essence is one; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the latter is. To which may be added, that if essence and _the one_ are the same, multitude will be the same as that which has no existence, and which is not essence. This, however, is impossible. For in essence the many are contained, and in that which is not essence is _the one_. But if essence and _the one_ are not the same, they will not be coordinate to each other; for if they were coordinate there will be some other thing prior to them, if it is necessary that all things should subsist from one principle. And if one of these is better than the other, either _the one_ is prior to essence, or essence is prior to _the one_. But if _the one_ indeed is prior to essence, this and not essence is the principle of all things. For it is necessary that nothing should be better than the principle. And if essence is prior to _the one_, _the one_ will be passive to essence, and not essence to _the one_. But if _the one_ is passive to essence, it is necessary that _the one_ and essence should be every thing, and that all such things as are one should be essence, but not that all such things as are essence should be one. There will, therefore, be a certain essence deprived of _the one_. If, however, this be the case, it will be nothing. For that which is deprived of _the one_ is nothing. Hence _the one_ is prior to essence.