beyond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings; but at another time we evince that it is equivalent to being; just as I think, the Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being is in no respect less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being; and at another time we leave it as a privation of, and indigent of being. For indeed, according to this mode, we call every generation, and matter itself, non-being. Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither any reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things posterior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature is not of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of beings; but _the good_ transcends the whole of things in a much greater degree than intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself, whether it be the demiurgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or some other intellect from among the number of those that are called divine. Every intellect however, and every god, is allotted a transcendency with respect to subordinate natures, and those things of which it is the cause, inferior to that which the first principle has to every being; for this principle similarly transcends all things, and not some in a greater, but others in a less degree; since thus we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to secondary natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habitude to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no habitude or communion with things posterior to itself. CHAPTER VI.