therefore, can we adduce, or what redundancy besides _the one_, if each of these also is by itself one? For if each of them is one and many, we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if each is one only, in the same manner as _the one itself_, why does this rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but each of these is allotted a secondary dignity? Neither therefore shall we preserve the transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfused either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them. But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces _the one_ together with being, and demonstrates that there are as many parts of _the one_ as there are of being; that each being[164] also participates of _the one_, but that _the one_ is every where consubsistent with being; and in short, who asserts that the one of the second hypothesis participates of being, and is participated by being, the participation in each not being the same. For _the one_ indeed participates of being, as not being primarily one, nor exempt from being, but as illuminating truly-existing essence. But being participates of _the one_, as that which is connected by it, and filled with divine union, and converted to _the one itself_ which is imparticipable. For the participated monads conjoin beings to _the one_ which is exempt from the whole of things, in the same manner as participated intellects conjoin souls to the intellect which ranks as a whole, and as participated souls conjoin bodies to the soul which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible that the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without media to the cause which is exempt from multitude; but it is necessary that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar multitude, so far indeed as it is multitude, communicates with the dissimilar; but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself, it is conjoined with it. Being established therefore, in the middle of both, it is united to the whole, and to _the one_ which is prior to multitude. But it contains in itself remote progressions, and which are of themselves dissimilar to _the one_. Through itself also, it converts all things to that one, and thus all things are extended to the first cause of the whole of things, dissimilars indeed through similars,[165] but similars through themselves. For similitude itself by itself conducts and binds the many to _the one_, and converts secondary natures to the monads prior to them. For the very being of similars so far as they are similars is derived from _the one_. Hence, it conjoins multitude to that from which it is allotted its progression. And on this account similitude is that which it is, causing many things to be allied, to possess sympathy with themselves, and friendship with each other and _the one_.