The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding
from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange
after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles?
What[174] the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after
the first principle, we shall in the next place survey. For conformably
to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles
after _the one_. In the Philebus therefore, Socrates says, that God
gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all
beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus
subsisting from the connexion of things bounded, and things infinite.
If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they
themselves have a subsistence prior to beings. And if secondary natures
participate of these mingled together, these will subsist unmingled
prior to the whole of things. For the progression of the divine orders
originates, not from things coordinated and which exist in others,
but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves. As
therefore _the one_ is prior to things united, and as that which is
passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable union,
thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of
and commixture with beings, are themselves by themselves the causes of
the whole of things. For it is necessary that bound should be prior
to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the
similitude to _the one_ of things which proceed from it. For again,
if we should produce beings immediately after _the one_, we shall no
where find the peculiarity of _the one_ subsisting purely. For neither
is being the same with _the one_, but it participates of _the one_,
nor in reality is that which is the first _the one_; for, as has been
frequently said, it is better than _the one_. Where therefore is that
which is most properly and entirely one? Hence there is a certain one
prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the
cause of it; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a
cause without habitude with respect to all things, and imparticipable,
being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of
being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of
being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own
power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces
and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it
were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause.
For being which is produced from these, and which is not _the one
itself_, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from _the one_,
through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from _the
one_; but its occult union from the hyparxis of _the one_. This one
therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the