The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in
the Philebus calls _bound_, but he denominates the power of it which is
generative of being, _infinity_. But he thus speaks in that dialogue,
“God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings.”
The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated
by him God; because each of the second Gods is participated by being,
and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as
being exempt[175] from the whole of beings, is God, defined according
to the ineffable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But
the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown
and imparticipable cause; bound indeed, being the cause of stable,
uniform, and connective deity; but the infinite being the cause of
power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in
short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union
and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures,
are suspended[176] from the first bound. But all division, prolific
production, and progression into multitude, derive their subsistence
from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we say that each of
the divine orders abides[177] and at the same time proceeds, we must
confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds
according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity
and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of
bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all
the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the
more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity.
For from these two principles all things have their progression into
being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself
participates at once of bound and infinity; so far indeed, as it is
the intelligible measure, it participates of bound; but so far as it
is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of
infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole,
and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it
is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it produces all things
eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying
all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power
undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul indeed, in
consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and
introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of
bound; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making
the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital
circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this
heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the
order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions, is bounded.