The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
To this question therefore they may answer: Do you say there is one
thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They
will. What then, do you call being any thing? Yes. Do you call it _the
one_, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?
What will be their answer after this O guest?” Through this therefore,
Plato separating _the one_ and being from each other, and showing that
the conception of _the one_ is different from that of being, and that
these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper
and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does
not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the
form of one. But _the one itself_ is exempt from every addition. For by
whatever you may add to it, you will diminish its supreme and ineffable
union. Hence it is necessary to arrange _the one_ prior to the one
being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For
if _the one_ and the one being were the same, and it made no difference
to say one and being (since if they differed, _the one_ would again
be changed from the one being,) if therefore _the one_ differs in no
respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not
be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things,
lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being
exempt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a
name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear
to be the same with the thing. And neither will a name be the name of a
thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same
with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,[197] and a thing will
be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the
same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If
therefore, these things are absurd, and _the one_ is, and also being,
and being participates of _the one_, _the one_ and the one being are
not the same.