The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning
of the second hypothesis, adjoining to _the one_ the most simple
participation of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says
that being participates of _the one_, and _the one_ of being. The
participation however of these is different. For _the one_[202] indeed
so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying
being; but being so participates of _the one_, as suspended from _the
one_, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both,
is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is
among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case
with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For
it is of _the one_, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion
of _the one_, and its progression into being. Parmenides delivers this
triad, beginning what he says about it as follows: “See therefore from
the beginning if _the one_ is. Is it possible then for it to be, and
yet not to participate of essence? It is not possible.” But he ends
speaking about it in the following words: “Will therefore that which
is said be any thing else than this, that _the one_ participates of
essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that _the one_ is?
It will not.” This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the
one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of _the
one_ and _the one_ of being, in a manner perfectly admirable; Plato
indicating through these things, that the father is the father of
intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, and that
power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of
the triad, and being is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not
intellect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect
of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the
Elean guest says. But that which is primarily being, neither stands
still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is
called one being; since power is here occultly. For the triad does not
proceed from itself; but subsists without separation and uniformly,
being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the
first participation of essence, which participates of _the one_ through
power as the middle, which collects together and separates both _the
one_ and being. And it is superessential indeed, but is conjoined with
essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny
of essence. For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are
consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through
this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly therefore, does
poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For
essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things; since
they are not constitutive of superessential natures. The first triad