The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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that are in this place, to be of this kind, [viz. to be of the feminine
genus] I mean science herself, justice herself, temperance herself,
truth herself, and Adrastia; which may especially be considered as a
certain indication, that Plato particularly attributes the feminine to
this order, and not only other theologists.
CHAPTER XI.
What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place
celebrates this deity negatively, analogous to _the one_? And
what are the negations? For he denominates it, without colour, without
figure, and without contact. And he takes away from it these three
hyparxes, colour, figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order
being the summit of the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable,
according to its peculiarity, and is [only] to be known through
intelligible impressions. For being the summit of intellectuals, it
conjoins itself with intelligibles. For how could intellectuals be
conjoined with intelligibles, unless they antecedently constituted
an intelligible transcendency of themselves? But what connexion and
communion could be surveyed of the whole orders of things, unless the
extremities of such as are first possessed a certain similitude to the
beginnings of such as are second? For on account of this similitude,
these are connascent with each other, and all things subsist according
to one series. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was intellectual,
so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an intelligible
hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible; but the one is
intelligible simply; and the other is not intelligible without the
addition of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with
each other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of
things, so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in
it is extended intelligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive
of the same things, because it is intellectual, and intelligible good
presides in the intellectual genus. All things therefore, are from
both, exemptly indeed, from the intellectual of intelligibles, but
coordinately, from the intelligible of intellectuals. And both indeed,
rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are alone, as Plato says, known by
intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impressions. Hence also he calls
the attempt boldness which endeavours to unfold the arcana concerning
them, and to explain by words their unknown union.