The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of
intellectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it
conjoins itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their
unical, ineffable, and paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an
unknown manner prior to intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible
by the natures posterior to it; but it is known by those prior to
it, being super-expanded into a continued union with them.[217] It
likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly; but this
does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge. For
intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and
occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united
triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the
unknown union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and
unknown power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato
mystically unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is
highest, and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God.
As therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God through negations,
after the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform
and unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since Socrates
in the Phædrus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place,
arranging it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the
ascent of souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timæus,
Plato contends that the one demiurgus through whom every demiurgic
genus of Gods subsists, is ineffable and unknown; and every where that
which is highest has this transcendency with respect to secondary
natures. For it imitates the cause which is at once unically exempt
from all beings. We celebrate this cause however, through negations
alone, as existing prior to all things; but we unfold the summits
which proceed analogous to it, affirmatively and at the same time
negatively. As participating indeed, the natures prior to themselves,
we celebrate them affirmatively. For Plato calls the supercelestial
place essence which truly is, the plain of truth, the meadow, and the
intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and he does not only call it
without colour, without figure, and without contact, thus mingling
affirmations with negations. For this order is a medium between the
intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine orders, containing
the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectually, according to
a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits the plenitudes of
intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise elevates
all things at once, according to one common union, as far as to
the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far us
to matter. Being therefore established between the unical and the
multiplied Gods, it is unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown
manner in which it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively