The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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But if he should call intelligible
animal number, in this case there will be separation and difference
in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole
of things, according to supreme union. For all section and division
originate from the intellectual Gods; since here difference proceeds,
adorning things in conjunction with _the one_ and being. How therefore,
does the division of the unities into minute parts, or the multiform
nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can the multitude
of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the tetrad was
there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind being
adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one being
is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is conjoined
with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since however, it
comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timæus denominates it
the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four first-effective causes.
For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the production
of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad subsist
unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.
Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with
separation. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the
peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them.[244] Hence,
the first multitudes proceed indeed from _the one_, but they
are unical, without separation, and without number, imitating the
one principle of the whole of things. Very properly therefore, does
Parmenides constitute multitude in intelligibles, according to the end
[of the intelligible order]; but number in intellectuals according to
the beginning [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual
order.] And these are conjoined with each other. Parmenides also
pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause
of intellectual numbers. And Timæus shows that animal itself is
only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of
things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That
number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, we have abundantly
shown.
CHAPTER XXXIII.