The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which
is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it
will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of
all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be
able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this
be the case it will also make itself[206] more powerful. For impotency
cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will;
since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to
render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before
it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is
produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing
cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than
the nature of the thing produced.
PROPOSITION VIII.
_Concerning the first good, which is called_ the good itself.
That which is primarily good, and which is no other than _the good
itself_ is the leader of all things that in any way whatever
participate of good.
* * * * *
For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is
primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some one
being, either being and _the good_ are the same, and this particular
being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which
it is passive, [i.e. since it is _the good_]. For that which aspires
after any thing is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is
different from it. And [if some one being and _the good_ are the same]
being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being
will be _the good_. Hence, _the good_ is a certain good inherent in a
certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires,
but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For
this is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is
inherent in a certain thing, pertains to that alone which participates
of it. Hence, that which is primarily good, is nothing else than good.
For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition
_the good_, and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that
which is simply good. For that which is added not being _the good_, but
something less than it will by its own essence diminish _the good_.
PROPOSITION IX.
_Concerning that which is sufficient to itself._
Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence,
or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not
sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended
from another cause.
* * * * *