The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies
well-being from itself,[207] but another is indigent of something
else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the
other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the
former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to _the
good_], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is
indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection
of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to
itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to _the good
itself_ [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished
indeed through participating of _the good_, and because it is not
primarily _the good_. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so
far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and
to participate through another, are more remote from that which is
primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.
PROPOSITION X.
Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is
simply good.
* * * * *
For what else is a thing sufficient to itself, than that which from
itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and
participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is
better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated.
If, therefore, that which is sufficient to itself, fills itself with
good, that from which it fills itself, will be more excellent than
the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency. And neither
will that which is simply good be indigent of any thing. For it does
not aspire after any thing else; since by aspiring after it would be
deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to
itself. For thus it would be full of good, and would not be primarily
the good.
PROPOSITION XI.
_Concerning Cause._
All beings proceed from one first cause.
* * * * *
For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all
finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one
thing is the cause of another, and the pre-subsistence of essence
will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings,
there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things
perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things
generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there
be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of
science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the
causes of things.[208]