But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause. And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the causality of the cause. And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being. For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary there should be one principle has been demonstrated;[209] because all multitude subsists posterior to _the one_. PROPOSITION XII. The principle and first cause of all beings is _the good_. * * * * * For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either _the good_, or that which is more excellent than _the good_. But if it is more excellent than _the good_, whether is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite that something should be present from cause to things caused,[210] and especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by _the good_, there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above _the good_, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.[211] But what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence, if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to _the good_. If, likewise, all beings aspire after _the good_, how is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to _the good_, how can they especially aspire after _the good_? But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that