The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence,
if it is _the good_ from which all beings are suspended, _the good_ is
the principle and first cause of all things.
PROPOSITION XIII.
Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union
is good; and _the good_ is the same with _the one_.
* * * * *
For if _the good_ is preservative of all beings, (on which account
also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative
and connective of the essence of every thing, is _the one_; for all
things are preserved by _the one_, and dispersion removes every
thing from essence;--if this be the case, _the good_ will cause
those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and
contain them according to union. And if _the one_ is collective and
connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence.
Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however,
union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply
good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time
benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner
fall off from _the good_, are at the same time also deprived of the
participation of _the one_. And those things which become destitute
of _the one_, being filled with separation, are after the same manner
likewise deprived of _the good_. Hence, goodness is union, and union is
goodness, and _the one_ is that which is primarily good.
PROPOSITION XIV.
_Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle, or cause._
Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either
moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself,
it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing
therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.
* * * * *