The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce
from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very
being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from
it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it
will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore
it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself.
Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining
with _the ever_ according to energy of the cause, its own ever
according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also
which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which
has its being through motion, changes its being when its moveable
cause[240] is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should
itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause.
This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable.
Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the
motion of that which gave it subsistence.
PROPOSITION LXXVII.
Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy.
And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which
is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is
the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that
which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things
in energy.
* * * * *
For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce
itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect
it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in
energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced
by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity,
will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on
this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of
perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in
capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence,
if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its
perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity;
but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or
it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was
in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something
else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own
peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in
another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy,
unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains,
therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity
must be changed into energy.
PROPOSITION LXXVIII.
Every power is either perfect or imperfect.
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