The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted
the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it
would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity,
according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.[252]
But if it is inferior to other things, and proceeds from them, it
does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so
far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates,
it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of
which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is
imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and
is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the
cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant
of other things.
PROPOSITION C.
Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and
principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle
of all things.
* * * * *
For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain
sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the
cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every
series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred
to _the one_; because all of them are analogous to _the one_. So far
therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same through
an analogy to _the one_, so far a reduction of them to _the one_ is
effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are from _the one_, no
one of these is a principle. But so far as each is imparticipable,
so far each is a principle. Hence, being the principles of certain
things, they are suspended from the principle of all things. For that
is the principle of all things of which all things participate. All
things however alone entirely participate of the first; but of other
things not all, but certain things participate. Hence also that [i.e.
the ineffable] is simply the first, but other things are firsts with
reference to a certain thing, but simply are not firsts.
PROPOSITION CI.
Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate
of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of
life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of
being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to
intellect.
* * * * *