The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to
things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should
be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures,
and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however,
that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that
which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will
be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and
intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of
intelligence necessarily _is_; but not vice versa. For many beings
neither live, nor energize intellectually.[253] But life is the second.
For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life,
but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute
of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in
any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is
the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number,
and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the
second, and intellect the third.
PROPOSITION CII.
All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the
infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings
are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings
participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.
* * * * *
For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own
peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident
that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same
time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also
imparts to all things the motion which it possesses in itself. For
life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of
being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit
of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic
nature.
PROPOSITION CIII.
All things are in all, but appropriately in each.
* * * * *