The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and
intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect
indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in
being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists
either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to
participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in
the second, the first is according to participation, but the third,
according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are
according to participation;--this being the case, life and intellect
have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing
is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause
(for cause pertains to other things, i.e. to effects) nor according
to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it
participates,)--hence in being there is truly life and intellection,
essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being
indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause.
Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is
according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according
to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For
knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.
PROPOSITION CIV.
Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its
energy eternal.
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For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it
does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it
participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is
impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than
essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not
participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which
is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time
will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence
of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time,
will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily
eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing
which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.
PROPOSITION CV.
Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is
immortal.
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