The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
_Gorg._ I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court
of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public
assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover,
by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of
gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained
money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak,
and persuade the multitude.
_Socr._ At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shewn as nearly as
possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I
understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of
persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates
in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of
producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?
_Gorg._ By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it
sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.
18. _Socr._ Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade
myself, if there is any one, who in conversing with another, wishes to
know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say,
that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.
_Gorg._ What then, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as
resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is
conversant, be assured I do not clearly understand, not but that I have
a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed:
yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from
rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who
have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your
account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a
manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. 19.
For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you:
just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you
were to tell me that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of
you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so[61]?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And would it not be for this reason, because there are also
other painters who paint many other animals?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have
answered properly.
_Gorg._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears
to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce
it likewise? My meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade
what he teaches, or not?
_Gorg._ He does certainly persuade, Socrates.
_Socr._ Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made
mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number?
and does not an arithmetician the same?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
20. _Socr._ Does it not also persuade?
_Gorg._ Yes.