_Socr._ Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion. _Gorg._ It appears so. _Socr._ If, then, any one should ask us, What persuasion it produces, and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may shew, that all the other arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so? _Gorg._ Yes. _Socr._ Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion. _Gorg._ You say truly. _Socr._ Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this question may fairly be asked? ----- Footnote 61: I have ventured to read ἢ οὔ for καὶ ποῦ, for which my only excuse is that the usual reading cannot be rendered intelligibly, and that the alteration I have ventured to import is an expression very commonly used by Socrates on similar occasions. ----- _Gorg._ It does. _Socr._ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case. 21. _Gorg._ I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust. _Socr._ I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat, for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of catching up each other’s words on suspicion; but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just as you please. _Gorg._ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates. _Socr._ Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn is any thing? _Gorg._ I do admit it. _Socr._ Again? to believe? _Gorg._ I do. _Socr._ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different? _Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that they are different. 22. _Socr._ You think rightly; and you may know from this; if any one should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you would say there is. _Gorg._ I should. _Socr._ Well then, is there a false and true science? _Gorg._ Certainly not. _Socr._ It is clear, therefore, that they (belief and science) are not the same. _Gorg._ You say truly. _Socr._ Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe. _Gorg._ Such is the case. _Socr._ Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other science? _Gorg._ Certainly.