34. _Socr._ Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base and the honourable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean, that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is honourable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, though he is ignorant, he appears to the ignorant to know more than one who possesses knowledge; or is it necessary that he should know these, and is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, teach him who comes to you none of these things (for it is not your province), but make him appear to the multitude to know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things? What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric. 35. _Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would learn these things from me. _Socr._ Stay; for you say well. If then you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before, or afterwards from your instructions. _Gorg._ Certainly. _Socr._ What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or not? _Gorg._ He is. _Socr._ And is not he who has learnt music, a musician? _Gorg._ Yes. _Socr._ And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient? _Gorg._ Certainly. _Socr._ By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just? _Gorg._ Assuredly. _Socr._ And he who is just surely performs just actions. _Gorg._ Yes. _Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary[65] that the just man should wish to do just actions? ----- Footnote 65: Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain of the argument. ----- _Gorg._ It appears so. _Socr._ The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly. _Gorg._ Necessarily. _Socr._ And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just? _Gorg._ Yes. _Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?