63. _Socr._ But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men. _Pol._ You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes. _Socr._ Yet I shall endeavour, my friend, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, then, the things about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one. _Pol._ Just so. _Socr._ But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice. _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was confuted by you. _Pol._ You were so, by Jupiter. _Socr._ At least as you think, Polus. _Pol._ And I probably thought the truth. _Socr._ But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are happy, if they do not suffer punishment. _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also? 64. _Pol._ But this is more difficult to refute than the former, Socrates. _Socr._ By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be refuted. _Pol._ How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at last be crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant, and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things? _Socr._ You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to compass absolute power? _Pol._ I did. _Socr._ In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and acquires absolute power. 65. What is this, Polus? do you laugh? Is this another species of refutation, when any one asserts any thing, to laugh at him, and not refute him? _Pol._ Do you not think you are already refuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask any one of these.