_Socr._ And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or pleasant, or both? _Pol._ So it appears to me. _Socr._ And is it not the same with the beauty of the sciences? _Pol._ Certainly. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, in defining the beautiful by pleasure and good. _Socr._ Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, by pain and evil? _Pol._ Necessarily so. _Socr._ When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful because it excels in one or both of these, either in pleasure, or utility, or both. _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ And when of two things one is more base than the other, it must be more base because it exceeds in pain or evil: is not this necessarily so? _Pol._ Yes. 68. _Socr._ Come then; what did we say just now respecting committing injustice and suffering it? Did you not say that to suffer injustice is more evil, but to commit it, more base? _Pol._ I did say so. _Socr._ Therefore, since it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, it must be more base because it is more painful and exceeds in pain, or evil, or both. Is not this also necessary? _Pol._ How can it be otherwise? _Socr._ First, then, let us consider whether to commit injustice exceeds in pain the suffering it; and whether they who commit injustice feel greater pain than they who suffer it. _Pol._ This is by no means the case, Socrates. _Socr._ It does not, then, exceed in pain? _Pol._ By no means. _Socr._ Therefore, if it does not exceed in pain, it will no longer exceed in both. _Pol._ It appears not. _Socr._ It remains, therefore, that it exceeds in the other. _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ In the evil. _Pol._ So it seems. _Socr._ Since, therefore, to commit injustice exceeds in evil, it must be more evil than to suffer injustice. _Pol._ Evidently so. 69. _Socr._ Was it not admitted by men in general, and by you to me formerly, that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ Now, however, it appears to be worse. _Pol._ So it seems. _Socr._ Would you, then, rather choose that which is worse and more base, than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus, (for you will not be injured by so doing,) but answer, giving yourself up generously to the discussion as to a physician; and either admit or deny the question I ask. _Pol._ Then I should not rather choose it, Socrates. _Socr._ Would any other man in the world? _Pol._ To me it appears not, according to what has been said. _Socr._ I therefore said truly, that neither you, nor I, nor any other man in the world, would rather choose to commit injustice than to suffer it; for it is worse to do so. _Pol._ So it appears.