_Socr._ You see then, Polus, that my mode of proof when compared with your mode of proof, does not at all resemble it; but all others agree with you, except myself. For my part you alone are sufficient for my purpose, agreeing with me and testifying for me; and I, having asked your opinion only, disregard that of others. Let this then be settled between us. 70. And next, let us proceed to consider that which we doubted about in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice to be punished, as you thought, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished, as I thought. And let us consider it thus: To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, when one has committed injustice, do you not call the same thing? _Pol._ I do. _Socr._ Can you say, then, that all just things are not beautiful, so far as they are just? When you have well considered, answer me. _Pol._ It appears to me that they are, Socrates. _Socr._ Consider this also: When a man does any thing, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent? _Pol._ It appears so to me. _Socr._ And does not the patient suffer what the agent does, and just such a thing as the agent does? I mean in this way: If any one strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck? _Pol._ It is necessary. _Socr._ And if the striker strikes hard or swiftly, must not the thing struck be stricken accordingly? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ That which is struck, then, undergoes a passion corresponding to that which the striker does. _Pol._ Certainly. 71. _Socr._ In like manner, if any one burns, is it not necessary that something should be burnt? _Pol._ How can it be otherwise? _Socr._ And if he burns vehemently or painfully, that which is burnt must be burnt according as the burner burns? _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ So, if any one cuts any thing, is not the reasoning the same? for something is cut. _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ And if the cut is large or deep, or painful, that which is cut is cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts. _Pol._ It appears so. _Socr._ In a word, then, see if you grant what I just now said respecting every thing, viz., that according as the agent does, so the patient suffers. _Pol._ I do grant it. _Socr._ These things, then, being agreed on, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something? _Pol._ Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer. _Socr._ Must it not, therefore, be by some agent? _Pol._ Undoubtedly: by him who chastises. _Socr._ But does not he who chastises rightly, chastise justly? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ Doing what is just, or not? _Pol._ What is just. _Socr._ Then, does not he who is chastised, when he is deservedly punished, suffer justly? _Pol._ It appears so. _Socr._ But what is just has been acknowledged to be beautiful. _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ Of these, then, the one does, and the other, he that is chastised, suffers that which is beautiful. _Pol._ Yes.