_Socr._ Whether those who act unjustly, and are intemperate? _Pol._ Do you mean, to the judges? _Socr._ Is it not, then, that they may be punished? _Pol._ I grant it. _Socr._ Do not then those who chastise rightly chastise by employing a certain justice? _Pol._ Clearly. _Socr._ The art of money-making, therefore, frees from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice. _Pol._ So it appears. _Socr._ Which of these, therefore, is the most beautiful? _Pol._ Of what are you speaking? _Socr._ The art of money-making, medicine, and justice. _Pol._ Justice, Socrates, is far superior. _Socr._ Does it not, then, produce the greatest pleasure, or utility, or both, since it is the most beautiful? _Pol._ Yes. 75. _Socr._ Is it, then, pleasant to be under the care of a physician? and do they who are under such charge rejoice? _Pol._ It does not appear so to me. _Socr._ But it is useful. Is it not? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ For they are freed from a great evil; so that it is advantageous to endure pain and be restored to health. _Pol._ How can it be otherwise? _Socr._ Would the man then, thus be most happy with respect to his body who is under the care of a physician, or who is not diseased at all? _Pol._ Clearly he that is not diseased. _Socr._ For this is not happiness, as it seems, the being freed from evil; but the never possessing it at all. _Pol._ It is so. _Socr._ But what? Of two men that have evil, either in body or soul, which is the more miserable, he that is under the care of a physician, and is freed from the evil, or he that is not under the care of a physician, and retains the evil? _Pol._ It appears to me, he that is not under the care of a physician. _Socr._ And is not punishment the being freed from the greatest evil, depravity? _Pol._ It is. _Socr._ For justice produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity? _Pol._ Yes. 76. _Socr._ He, then, is most happy who has no vice in his soul, since this is proved to be the greatest of evils. _Pol._ It is evident. _Socr._ The second, surely, is he who is freed from it. _Pol._ So it seems. _Socr._ But this is he who is admonished, reproved, and punished. _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ He, therefore, lives worst, who is afflicted with injustice, and is not freed from it. _Pol._ It appears so. _Socr._ Is not, then, he one who, having committed the greatest injustice, and employing the greatest injustice, contrives that he may be neither admonished, nor chastised, nor punished, as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful men? _Pol._ So it seems. _Socr._ For these, my excellent friend, have managed much the same as one who being afflicted with the worst diseases should contrive not to have his bodily maladies corrected or subjected to medical treatment, fearing, as if he were a child, to be burnt and cut, because these operations are painful. Does it not appear so to you?