_Pol._ It does. _Socr._ Being ignorant, as it seems, of what health is, and a good habit of the body. 77. Now from what we have just agreed on, Polus, those who flee from punishment appear to do something of this kind; they look to the pain attending it, but are blind to its utility, and are ignorant how much more miserable than an unhealthy body it is to dwell with an unhealthy soul, that is corrupt, unjust, and impious. Whence they do every thing that they may not be punished, nor freed from the greatest evil, procuring for themselves riches and friends, and the power of speaking as persuasively as possible. But if we have agreed on what is true, Polus, do you perceive what consequences result from our discourse? do you wish that we should draw the conclusions from them? _Pol._ I do, unless you think otherwise. _Socr._ Does it not follow that injustice and to act unjustly is the greatest evil? _Pol._ It appears so. _Socr._ And to suffer punishment was proved to be a means of freedom from this evil. _Pol._ It appears to be so. _Socr._ But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil. _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ To act unjustly, therefore, is the second of evils in magnitude; but to act unjustly and not to suffer punishment is the greatest and chief of all evils. _Pol._ So it seems. 78. _Socr._ Was not this the point, my friend, with respect to which we differed, you considering Archelaus happy, for that having committed the greatest injustice he suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether Archelaus, or any other man whatever, is not punished when he commits injustice, he must needs be far more wretched than all other men, and that he who commits injustice is ever more wretched than he who suffers it, and he that is not punished than he that is. Are not these the things that I said? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ And has it not been demonstrated that they were said truly? _Pol._ It appears so. _Socr._ Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, every one ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, for that, _if he does so act_, he will sustain great evil. Is it not so? _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or any one else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and incurable; or what must we say, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in this, but in no other way? 79. _Pol._ For what else can we say, Socrates?