The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
113. _Socr._ You know, though you pretend not, Callicles.
_Cal._ Proceed still further, trifling as you are, that you may know how
wise you are who take upon yourself to admonish me.
_Socr._ Does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to
receive pleasure from drinking?
_Cal._ I do not know what you mean.
_Gorg._ Say not so, Callicles; but answer for our sakes, that the
discussion may be brought to a conclusion.
_Cal._ But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, he asks
trifling questions, and things that are of no consequence, and then
refutes them.
_Gorg._ But what difference does that make to you? That is no concern at
all of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever way he pleases.
_Cal._ Ask, then, these trifling and petty questions, since Gorgias
thinks proper.
_Socr._ You are happy, Callicles, in that you have been initiated in the
great mysteries before you were in the small: but I thought that was not
allowed. Answer me, then, from the point where you left off, does not
each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive
pleasure?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And does not one cease to be hungry and to feel other desires
and pleasures at the same time?
_Cal._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Does one not, then, at the same time cease to feel both pains
and pleasures?
_Cal._ Yes.
114. _Socr._ However one does not at the same time cease to experience
good and evil, as you admitted; but now do you not admit it?
_Cal._ I do. But what then?
_Socr._ It follows, my friend, that good things are not the same with
such as are pleasant, nor evil things with such as are painful. For,
from these one ceases at the same time, but not from those, because they
are different. How, therefore, can pleasant things be the same with such
as are good, or painful things with such as are evil? But, if you
please, consider it in this way: for I think that you are not even thus
agreed with yourself. Consider then. Do you not call the good good, from
the presence of good things, just as you call those beautiful to whom
beauty is present?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ But what? Do you call foolish men and cowards good men? For you
did not just now; but you said the brave and prudent were so. Do you not
call these good?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what? Have you ever seen a boy without understanding,
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
_Socr._ And have you not also seen a man without understanding,
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I think I have. But to what purpose is this?
_Socr._ Nothing: answer however.
_Cal._ I have seen it.
_Socr._ But what? have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
115. _Socr._ But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the
foolish?
_Cal._ I think there is not much difference.
_Socr._ That is enough. In war have you ever seen a coward?
_Cal._ Most assuredly.