_Socr._ Therefore, the bad man becomes equally bad and good, with the good man, or even more good? Do not these results follow, as well as the former ones, if one says that the pleasant and the good are the same? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles? _Cal._ I have been long listening to you, Socrates, and making concessions, considering with myself that if any one grants you any thing, even in jest, you seize it eagerly as boys do. And can you suppose that I or any other person in the world does not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse? 118. _Socr._ Ho, Ho! Callicles, how cunning you are! You treat me as a child, now asserting that these things are in this manner, and now in another manner; trying to deceive me. Though, at the outset, I did not think that I should be purposely deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I have been mistaken, and as it seems, must needs, according to the old proverb, make good use of what I have, and receive what you give me. What you now say, as it appears, is this, that some pleasures are good, others bad; is it not so? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ And are not the profitable good, and the noxious bad? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ And those which effect a certain good, are profitable, but those which effect a certain evil, bad? _Cal._ I admit it. _Socr._ Do you not speak then of such as the following; as for instance, with respect to the body, those pleasures which we just now mentioned of eating and drinking; and if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other bodily excellences, are they not good, but those that produce the contraries of these, evil? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ And are not pains, in like manner, some beneficial, others injurious? _Cal._ Undoubtedly. _Socr._ Ought we not, therefore, both to choose and to exercise ourselves in such pleasures and pains as are beneficial? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ But not such as are injurious? _Cal._ That is evident. 119. _Socr._ For, if you remember, it was agreed between us, Polus and me, that all things should be done for the sake of what is good. And do you agree with us in thinking, that the good is the end of all actions, and that all other things ought to be done for its sake, but not it for the sake of other things? Do you accord with us and make up the third? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ We ought, then, to do both all other things and such as are pleasant, for the sake of things good, but not good things for the sake of such as are pleasant? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ Is every man, therefore, able to choose among pleasant things such as are good, and such as are evil? or is there need of a person skilled in each case? _Cal._ Of a person skilled.