_Cal._ The latter is clearly the case, Socrates, with respect to Cinesias. _Socr._ But what as to his father Meles? Did he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? or did not he look to what was most pleasant? For in singing he offended the audience. Consider, however; does not all harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure? _Cal._ It does. 124. _Socr._ But what of that venerable and wonderful art, tragic poetry, at what does it aim? Do its endeavour and aim appear to you to be only to gratify the spectators? or does it strive, if any thing should be pleasing and grateful to them, but mischievous, to avoid saying this, but if it happens to be unpleasant and beneficial, to say and sing this, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? In which of these two ways do you think tragic poetry is framed? _Cal._ This is clear, Socrates, that it rather aims at pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators. _Socr._ Did we not just now say, Callicles, that a thing of this kind is flattery? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ Come then, if any one should take from all poetry, melody, rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than words remain? _Cal._ Necessarily so. _Socr._ Are not these words, then, addressed to a great multitude, and to the people? _Cal._ I admit it. _Socr._ Poetry, therefore, is a kind of popular speaking. _Cal._ It appears so. _Socr._ Therefore it must be a rhetorical method of popular speaking: for do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres? _Cal._ They do. 125. _Socr._ Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among the people, consisting at the same time of boys and women and men, slaves and free-men, of which we do not altogether approve; for we have called it flattery. _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ Well then. But as to the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, and the people in other cities consisting of free-men, what shall we say as to that? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too, endeavour to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means? _Cal._ This is not a simple question that you ask me. For there are some who, looking to the interest of the citizens, say what they do; but others are such as you describe.