_Socr._ What, then, in the body, is the name of that which results from order and regularity? _Cal._ You probably mean health and strength. _Socr._ I do. But what, again, is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and regularity? Endeavour to discover and mention it, as you did the name of the former. _Cal._ Why do not you say what it is yourself, Socrates? _Socr._ If it pleases you better, I will. But do you, if I seem to you to speak well, assent, if not, confute, and do not spare me. To me, then, it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health springs, and every other excellence of the body. Is it so, or not? _Cal._ It is. _Socr._ But the name belonging to the orderly and regular disposition of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence men become obedient to law and orderly; but these are justice and temperance. Do you admit this or not? _Cal._ Be it so. 129. _Socr._ Will not, then, that good rhetorician who follows the rules of art, looking to these things, address the arguments he uses and all his actions to souls, and if he should bestow a gift, will he not bestow it, and, if he should take any thing away, will he not take it away _with the same end_, always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and injustice banished; that temperance may be produced in them, and intemperance banished; and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice driven out. Do you grant this, or not? _Cal._ I do grant it. _Socr._ For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and ill-disposed, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but, according to right reason, even less? Is this so? _Cal._ Be it so. _Socr._ For I think it is of no advantage for a man to live with a miserable state of body; for thus it would be necessary for him to live miserably: is it not so? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ And do not physicians generally allow a man in health to satisfy his desires, as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink, but when ill, they scarcely ever allow him to satisfy himself with what he desires? Do you grant this too? _Cal._ I do. 130. _Socr._ And should not the same method, my excellent friend, be adopted with respect to the soul? So long as it is depraved, as being without understanding, intemperate, unjust and unholy, one ought to restrain it from the indulgence of its desires, and not permit it to do any thing except what will render it better? Do you admit this or not? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ For this surely is better for the soul itself. _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ And is not to restrain any one from what he desires to punish him? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, as you just now thought.