“By no means,” he replied, “since many men are brave, but unjust, and again just, but not wise.” “Are these, then, parts of virtue,” said I, “wisdom and courage?” “Most assuredly,” he replied, “and wisdom is chief of all the parts.” “And is every one of them,” said I, “different from every other?” “Yes.” “And has each of them its proper function, like the parts of the face? For instance, an eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; nor is any one of the others like any other, either as to its function, or in any other respect. Thus, then, with the parts of virtue, is not any one like any other, either in itself, or in its function? Is it not clear that such is the case, since it resembles our example?” “Such is the case, Socrates,” he replied. 52. Then I said, “Therefore none of the other parts of virtue are like science, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness.” “No,” he said. “Come then,” said I, “let us examine together what the character of each of them is. And first of all, thus; is justice a thing, or not a thing? to me it appears to be a thing; but what does it appear to you to be?” “To me also it appears to be a thing,” he replied. “What then? If some one were to ask you and me, ‘Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named, justice, whether is it in itself just or unjust?’ I should answer him that it is just: but what decision would you give? the same as mine, or different?” “The same,” he replied. “‘Justice, then, is precisely similar to being just,’ I should say in answer to one who asked the question. And would not you, too?” “Yes,” he said. “If, then, after this, he should ask us, ‘Do you not also say that holiness is something?’ we should reply, I think that we do?” “Yes,” he said. “‘Do you not say that this too is a thing?’ should we say it is, or not?” He allowed that we should say it is. “‘But whether do you say that this very thing is of such a nature as to be unholy, or holy?’ I for my part,” I said, “should be indignant at the question, and should say, ‘Speak properly, my good sir, for scarcely could any thing else be holy, if holiness itself be not holy.’ But what should you say? should not you give the same answer?” “Certainly,” he said. “If, then, after this, he should ask us, and say, ‘What then did you mean a little while ago? Or did I not hear you aright? For you appeared to me to say that the parts of virtue are so disposed to each other, that no one of them resembles any other;’ I, for my part should reply, ‘In other respects you heard aright, but in thinking that I too said this, you were mistaken; for Protagoras gave this answer, and I put the question.’ If then he should say, ‘Does he speak the truth, Protagoras; do you say that no one part of virtue is like any other of its parts? Is this your assertion?’ what answer would you give him?” “I must needs admit it, Socrates,” he replied.