“After admitting this, Protagoras, what answer should we give him, if he further asked us, ‘Is not holiness then of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor justice such as to be a holy thing, but such as to be not holy; and holiness such as to be not just, but unjust, and the former unholy? What answer should we give him? I, for myself, should say both that justice is holy, and holiness just. And for you, if you would permit me, I should make the very same answer, that justice is the same with holiness, or very like it, and that justice bears the nearest possible resemblance to holiness, and holiness to justice. But consider whether you would forbid me to give this answer, or does it seem so to you also?” “It does not altogether appear to me, Socrates,” he said, “to be so absolutely true, that I can grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a difference between them. However what matters that?” he continued: “if you wish it, let it be admitted between us that justice is holy, and holiness just.” 55. “Not so,” I replied, “for I do not require to examine into an ‘If you wish it,’ and ‘If you think so,’ but into what I think and what you think; but in saying ‘what I think and what you think,’ I mean this, I am of opinion that our argument will be best discussed if we put it out of the question altogether.” “Well then,” he said, “justice has some resemblance to holiness, for every thing resembles every other thing in some respect, for white in some sort resembles black, and hard, soft, and so with respect to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other; and the things which we just now said have different functions, and are not the one like the other, as the parts of the face do in a certain respect resemble each other; so that in this way you could prove this, if you pleased, that all things are similar to each other; yet it is not right to call things that have a certain similarity, similar, nor things that have a certain dissimilarity, dissimilar, though the similarity is very trifling.” 56. And I, wondering, said to him, “Do you think then that the just and the holy are so related to each other, that they have but a trifling similarity to one another?” “Not quite so,” he said, “nor on the other hand do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to do.” “However,” said I, “since you appear to me to be vexed at this, we will dismiss it, and consider this of the other things that you said. Do you call folly any thing?” He admitted he did. “And is not wisdom the direct contrary to this thing?” “It appears so to me,” he replied. “But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately[97], in so acting, or the contrary[98]?” ----- Footnote 97: