Cousin has well remarked that σωφροσύνη, which Socrates opposes to ἀφροσύνη, means both _temperance_ and _prudence_. We, as well as the French, have no single word that expresses both ideas at once. I have therefore, in imitation of Cousin, adopted the word _temperance_ throughout this part of the dialogue, for otherwise the dilemma to which Socrates brings his antagonist would be lost sight of, for he now compels him to admit that _temperance_ and _wisdom_ which he before distinguished from each other, are identical. Mr. Wright, in his scholar-like version of this dialogue, has used the word _discretion_ throughout, but it appears to me scarce worthy to be exalted into a virtue that is the twin-sister of wisdom. Further on, as will be noticed, I have also followed Cousin in translating σωφροσύνη prudence. Footnote 98: I have followed Stallbaum’s reading, who omits εἰ and ἔπραττον. ----- “To act temperately,” he replied. “And are they not temperate by temperance?” “Necessarily so.” “Do not they, then, who act wrongly, act foolishly, and are they not intemperate in so acting?” “I agree with you,” he said. “Acting foolishly, then, is the contrary to acting temperately.” He said it was. “Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, done through folly, and things done temperately through temperance?” He agreed. “If then any thing is done through strength, is it not done strongly, and if through weakness, weakly?” “It appears so.” “And if any thing is done with swiftness, swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?” He said it was. “And if any thing is done in the same manner, is it not done by the same means, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary means?” He granted it. 57. “Come then,” I said, “is there any thing beautiful?” He admitted there was. “Is any thing contrary to this except the ugly?” “There is not.” “But what? Is there any thing good?” “There is.” “And is any thing contrary to this except evil?” “There is not.” “What? is there any thing high in voice?” He said there is. “And is any thing contrary to this except the low?” “There is not,” he said. “Therefore,” said I, “to each several contrary there is only one contrary, and not many.” He granted it. “Come then,” said I, “let us reckon up our admissions. We have admitted that one thing only is contrary to one, but not more?” “We have.” “And that what is done contrariwise, is done by contraries?” He assented. “We admitted also that what is done foolishly is done contrariwise to that which is done temperately?” He assented. “And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly, by folly?” He agreed. “If therefore it is done contrariwise, must it not be done by a contrary?” “Yes.” “And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?” “Yes.” “Contrariwise?” “Certainly.” “Through contraries therefore?” “It appears so.” “Folly therefore is contrary to temperance?”