“So it appears.” “Do you remember, however, that we before admitted that folly is contrary to wisdom?” He allowed it. “And that one thing only is contrary to one?” “I grant it.” 58. “Which, then, of these positions must we retract, Protagoras? That which says, that one thing only is contrary to one, or that in which it was asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance, but that each is a part of virtue, and that besides being different, both they and their functions are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which of these, then, must we retract? for these two positions taken together are not set down in a very musical manner; for they neither accord, nor harmonize with each other. For how can they accord, since it is necessary that one thing only should be contrary to one, but not to more, but wisdom and temperance are found to be contrary to folly, which is one. Is it so, Protagoras,” I asked, “or otherwise?” He admitted that it was so, though very unwillingly. “Must not, then, temperance and wisdom be one and the same thing? Before, moreover, justice and holiness were found to be nearly the same. 59. Come, however,” said I, “Protagoras, let us not be disheartened, but examine the rest. Does a man who acts unjustly, appear to you to be prudent[99], because he acts unjustly?” ----- Footnote 99: As was before observed, it is now necessary for the thread of the argument to use the word _prudent_ instead of _temperate_, but the reader must bear in mind that in the original the two ideas are expressed by one word. ----- “I should be ashamed, Socrates,” he said, “to acknowledge this, though many men do say so.” “Whether, then, shall I address my argument to them,” I asked, “or to you?” “If you please,” said he, “discuss this statement first, the statement of the many.” “But it makes no difference to me, if only you will answer, whether these things appear so to you or not: for I am most anxious to sift the statement itself, though it may possibly happen, that both I who question, and you who answer, may ourselves be sifted.” At first, then, Protagoras began to give himself airs, for he objected that the subject was difficult; afterwards however, he agreed to answer. 60. “Come then,” said I, “answer me from the beginning. Do persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be prudent?” “Be it so,” he replied. “And by being prudent, do you mean thinking rightly?” He assented. “And by thinking rightly that they are well advised when they act unjustly?” “Be it so,” said he. “Is this the case,” I asked, “if they fare well in acting unjustly, or if they fare ill?” “If they fare well.” “Do you say then that certain things are good?” “I do.” “Are those things good, then,” I asked, “which are advantageous to men?” “By Jupiter,” said he, “and some things though they are not advantageous to men I call good.”