“I know not, Socrates,” he replied, “whether I should answer you as absolutely as you ask me, that pleasant things are all good, and painful things all evil; but it appears to me, not only with reference to the present answer, but also with reference to all the rest of my life, to be more safe to answer, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some painful things which are not evil, and there are some which are a third sort, and which are neither the one nor the other, neither good or evil.” 102. “But do you not call those things pleasant,” I said, “which partake of pleasure, or occasion pleasure?” “Certainly,” said he. “I ask this, then, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant, meaning to ask whether pleasure itself is not a good thing.” “As you frequently say, Socrates,” he replied, “we must examine this, and if the examination shall appear to be connected with our subject, and the same thing shall appear to be both pleasant and good, we must grant it; but if not, we must controvert it.” “Whether, then,” said I, “do you wish to take the lead in the examination, or shall I?” “You ought to take the lead,” he replied, “for you began the discussion.” 103. “Do you think, then,” said I, “that it will become clear to us in the following manner? just as if any one, examining a man from his form either with reference to his health, or any other operations of his body, on beholding his face and hands, should say, Come, strip, and shew me your breast and back, that I may examine you more closely; so I require something of the kind in reference to the present enquiry; perceiving that you are so affected as you say you are, with reference to the good and the pleasant, I have need to say some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me on this point, how are you affected with respect to knowledge? Does it appear to you as it does to most men, or otherwise? Most men think of knowledge in some such way as this; that it is not a strong, nor a guiding, nor a governing thing; nor do they conceive of it as being any thing of the kind; but though knowledge is often found in a man, they do not think that knowledge governs him, but something else, at one time passion, at another pleasure, at another pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear, absolutely forming their conceptions of knowledge, as of a slave dragged about by all the rest. Is such your opinion of it, or do you think that knowledge is a noble thing, and able to govern man, and that if a man knows good and evil he can never be overcome by any thing, so as to do any thing else than what knowledge bids him, and that wisdom is sufficient to protect mankind?” 104. “It appears to me,” he replied, “as you say, Socrates: and moreover, if for any man, it would be disgraceful for me not to assert that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of all human things.”