The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum — Plato — John Shaqi
The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
When Socrates had ended his recantation to Love, Phædrus expresses great
admiration of his speech; and adds that he doubts whether Lysias will
ever venture to write speeches again. But Socrates shews him that such
an expectation is altogether groundless; and after a charming little
episode on the origin of grasshoppers, proposes to consider in what a
correct mode of speaking and writing consists[113].
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Footnote 113:
§ 85-91.
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The first essential is that the speaker should know the truth of the
subject on which he is about to speak. And though it is commonly said
that an orator need not know what is really just, but only what will
appear so to the multitude, yet Socrates with great force destroys this
fallacy, and shews that such rhetoric is not an art but an inartistic
trick; for a genuine art of speaking neither does nor can exist without
laying hold of truth. Rhetoric must be an art that leads the soul by
means of argument. Now in courts of justice and popular assemblies men
succeed by making things appear similar to each other so far as they are
capable of being made appear so; and deception will more frequently
occur in things that nearly resemble each other, so that a person who
means to persuade or deceive another must be able to distinguish
accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things, and so lead his
hearer by means of resemblances. Taking this as his principle, Socrates
proceeds to shew that the speech of Lysias is altogether inartistic, for
that he ought first of all to have defined Love and divided it into its
different species and shewn of which class he was going to speak,
whereas he begins where he should have ended, and throughout speaks at
random without any definite design. He then proceeds to comment on his
own two speeches. In one he argued that favour ought to be shewn to one
that is in love, in the other to a person that is not in love. In one he
said that love was a kind of divine madness, and then dividing this
madness into four parts he shewed that the madness of Love is the best.
In these speeches, then, are seen the two methods of arguing correctly,
definition and division, the former of which contemplates many things
under one aspect and brings them together under one general idea, the
latter separates that general idea into species[114].
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Footnote 114:
§ 92-111.
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Socrates then ridicules the rules of rhetoric laid down by many of the
sophists, and having passed a high eulogium on Pericles, shews that a
perfect orator must know the real nature of the things to which he will
have to apply his speeches, and that is the soul; for as the power of
speech consists in leading the soul, he must know how many kinds of soul
there are, and by what arguments each kind is most easily
persuaded[115].
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Footnote 115:
§ 112-132.
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